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Abstract
The present paper attempts to assess whether at all and in what ways the development of alternative capital 
markets  may help an additional  mobilisation of  the  given economy's  domestic  financial  resources,  and, 
consequently, contribute significantly to economic development. Against the theoretical background of both 
the old and the new institutional  schools,  a model  of  institutional  change,  leading to  the  emergence of 
alternative capital markets, is introduced. Using the theory of games as the theoretical tool to formalize, the  
model leads to conclude that the institutional change in question is only partial and incremental. In the same 
time, it demonstrates that if developing countries already have or can create strong technological hubs in 
their territories, alternative capital markets can spur technological progress and economic growth, even if the 
main capital markets, being the benchmark for those, are in other countries.  
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Introduction
There are two meanings of the term 'alternative capital market'. The first one assumes that they are specific 
public capital markets, operated besides main capital markets, in which the barriers to entry are significantly 
lower than in the main ones and in which the possibilities of issuance of securities are limited in value and in  
kind.  Additionally,  whilst  investors'  safety in  the  main  capital  markets  is  guaranteed  mainly by public 
authorities, in charge of the given country's financial sector, in alternative markets this role is played by a 
group of private accredited sponsors commissioned by state authorities. The second meaning of 'alternative  
capital markets' designates the public capital markets of developing countries, important in the local scale but 
marginal in global comparison with 'the big ones', like London, New York or Amsterdam.
The point of the present paper is to explain, whether at all and in what ways the development of alternative 
capital  markets,  in both of  the meanings,  may  help an additional  mobilisation of  the given economy's 
domestic financial resources, and, consequently, contribute significantly to economic development. 
Alternative capital markets develop both in developing countries and the developed ones, proving that this 
institution is really needed by both entrepreneurs and investors. The present paper attempts to model the  
institutional change which leads to the emergence of alternative capital markets. 
Theoretical background
The study of institutional change requires a review of institutional economics, both the old school and the  
new one.  The  old  institutional  school  had  pretended  to  unifying  all  the  separate  strands  of  economics 
( Hamilton 1919) and the concept of broad legal, political and social context of the market was supposed to 
be the foundation of such unification ( Veblen 1899, 1919; Mitchell 1910, 1937; Hamilton 1919; Commons 
1931,  1934,  1965;  Ayres  1944).  At  present,  the  concept  of  the  so  –  called  “reconstitutive  downwards 
causation”  -  the  causal,  mutual  relationship  between  the  individual  and  the  institution  –  is  frequently 
introduced as the trademark of the old institutional economics ( Hodgson 1993, 2000). The same modern 
developments  of  the  traditional  institutionalism  tend  to  define  institutions  as  normative  systems, 
indispensable to society, with language considered as the most fundamental system of rules and normative 
systems almost put as equal to social structures ( ex Hodgson 2006; Searle 1995, 2005 ), which contrasts 
somehow with other studies, focusing more upon the transition from general norms to habit formation and 
individual behaviour ( Joas 1996; Twomey 1998; Kilpinen 2000). From the point of view of the broadly 
understood theory of economic development the contribution of the old institutionalism seems to be twofold. 
Firstly, it's the “institutions matter” assumption, viewed almost as an axiom today ( ex Nelson, Sampat 2001;  
World  Bank  2002).  Secondly  it  is  both  an  empirical  observation  and  a  theoretical  development  about 
institutional  change:  countries  with relatively inefficient  institutions cannot  just  switch to more efficient 
ones, the process of such change being progressive and imperfectly efficient in itself ( ex  Aoki 2007). 
So comes the concept  of  institutional  change.  It  covers,  as a matter  of  fact,  a  few qualitatively distinct  
phenomena: a) the emergence of new institutions and extinction of those having had existed so far b) internal  
change of existing institutions in their  normative and structural  aspect  c)  a change in the reconstitutive  
downwards causation from these institutions to individual habits and behaviour.  The approach to all these  
types of institutional change have a common intellectual denominator in the works of Carl Menger (1871) 
who  used  to  divide  institutions  into  two  categories:  the  “organic”  ones  arising  spontaneously  and  the 
“pragmatic” ones appearing as a results of planned social action. The Menger's theory was typical for the  
broader  classical,  Cartesian  manner  of  approaching  phenomena  through  classifying  them.  Should  it  be 
translated into more modern, hermeneutic view, every institutional change may be considered as composite 
of two processes, the spontaneous one and the planned one. This dichotomy inside institutional change uses 
to be approached either through an arbitrary assumption of prevalence of one kind of processes, usually that  
of deliberate normative change, the purely spontaneous being hard to theorize in itself  ( see ex Hodgson  
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2006),  or  through  game  theoretic  as  well  as  evolutionary  points  of  view.  The  theory of  games  offers 
interesting possibilities of incorporating dynamic formation of rules and their interaction with individual  
behaviour  (  ex Hurwicz 1960,  1996;  Aoki  2007 ),  though sooner or later  this  approach encounters one  
fundamental problem: at any given moment of the game there are some rules, sometimes called proto – rules,  
which are assumed to remain constant. They are institutions in fact and their stability is a purely arbitrary 
assumption. In other words, approaching institutional change from the game – theoretic point of view leads 
to the previously signalled practical necessity to focus on some level of normative change ( ex Nelson 1995;  
Greif 2006; North 1990; Aoki 2007). The evolutionary approach, present in the old institutionalism since its 
very beginnings (ex Veblen 1899, 1919 ) until most recent developments ( Nelson, Winter 1982; Andersen 
2004; Hodgson, Knudsen 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c), sees institutional change as a Darwinian process of 
adaptation and selection of institutions, with eventual elimination of inefficient ones. Such approach opens 
rich methodological horizons, with the possibility of transposing the whole panoply of research tools used by 
natural sciences. However, the same kind of methodological barrier, as that to notice for the theory of games,  
appears.  If  institutions  are  subject  to  adaptation  and  selection,  there  must  be  an  “environment”  which  
stimulates adaptation and provides rules of selection. Such an environment is, consequently, an institution or 
a set of institutions, and, by the same means, there must be a still broader environment which stimulated the 
adaptation of  those institutions.  This  broader  environment,  being an institution in  itself,  should also be 
subject to evolutionary changes triggered by changes in another environment etc. 
The methodological paradox going along both with the game theoretic and the evolutionary approach to 
studying institutional change in the lines of the old institutionalism, illustrates a general theoretical problem 
of the latter, which is the tendency to holism. Each institutional change tends to have such a broad and  
complex context that its study is supposed to lead to an overall theory of social change which in practical,  
empirical research proves non – operational. This is also the case  capital markets. Should they be viewed as 
a part of “the big picture”, the aforementioned picture encompasses most of the social and economic changes  
having taken place during the period of observation. The period of observation in itself becomes hard to  
define as in social systems there is always a history behind the current state of things.  
Thus asking the right questions is the crucial issue when applying traditional institutionalism to empirical  
research. Right means two things. The first is to keep in mind the hermeneutics of the old institutionalism. 
This school of economic thought had emerged at the verge of the XIX and XX century, as social systems in 
Europe began to stabilize after having had gone through a prolonged period of turbulent changes since the  
end of the XVIII century. Therefore the traditional institutionalism is grounded in the empirical observation  
of that  social structures and interactions tend to settle relatively quickly to safe routines after  a time of  
turmoil,  whatever  that  turmoil  might  have  been.  The theoretical  approach of  the  old institutionalism is 
particularly useful when considering such kind of situations, for example the periods of calming down after  
financial crises in capital markets. The second very important empirical fact, laying at the foundations of the 
old institutionalism is that the “settling down” to routine is an interaction between the legal and political  
design set up by public authorities and patterns of individual behaviour. 
The second thing about the “right questions to ask” is to be not too general and as well rooted as possible in  
basic conceptual framework, especially in definitions of what institutions actually are. Let's suppose that the 
Aoki's game – theoretic definition is adopted ( Aoki 2007, p.7), according to which  “An institution is self –  
sustaining, salient patterns of social interactions, as represented by meaningful rules that every agent knows  
and incorporated as agent's shared beliefs about the ways how the game is to be played”. This definition 
allows some assumptions useful for empirical research. Firstly, patterns of social interactions may be more or 
less apt to self – sustaining which, in turn, leads to assuming that institutions are only those of patterns,  
observable in the capital markets, which display the ability to last as most of their  environment changes,  
leaving intact, however, the social interactions to which they correspond.  According to this approach, some 
legal  norms  can  be  considered  as  institutions  and  some  others  not,  if  they  change  relatively  quickly.  
Secondly, still remaining in the field of social interactions, the definition suggests that their patterns may be 
more or less “salient”.  However imprecise the adjective may be, it  allows discrimination on a scale of  
“salience” which, in turn, may be translated into such an empirical variable as, for example, the degree to  
which the given pattern differentiates the social structure – a particular stock market or a particular period -  
from other structures. Thirdly, it is assumed that for a rule of behaviour to be considered as an institution, the  
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former has to find a proper place on the scales of “meaningfulness” and “incorporation to shared beliefs” 
which, once again, can yield an empirical measure after having gone to some lengths in interpretation. If, on  
the other hand, one adopts a much simpler Hodgson's definition, according to which “institutions are social  
structures” ( Hodgson 2006, p. 3), studying institutional change amounts to empirical research about the 
changes in social structures built upon capital markets.
The old institutional school provides a variety of definitions of what institutions actually are and, as pointed 
out before, it is important to remain precise at this level. Besides, traditional institutionalism had brought in  
its dowry some assumptions of crucial importance. Firstly,  it  concerns the concept of  market,  which is  
viewed  here  in  a  broad  manner,  with  regulators,  supervisors  and  operators  of  exchange  media  just  as  
important as the buyers and sellers themselves. Thus, the social interactions important for the way the capital 
market works are not only transactions of buying and selling, but also those related to influence, power,  
interdependence etc. It is worth to notice that such a point of view is radically different from the classical  
“political  economy” approach,  as represented by the writings of Adam Smith (  Smith 1863 )  or  Jean – 
Baptiste Say ( Say 1836), who, whereas attempting at an abundant description of the social context used to  
state  very  firmly  that  a  market  is  composed  of  buyers  and  sellers,  all  external  intervention  into  their  
transactions being a mere disturbance. Secondly, the behaviour of market participants is causally related to 
some set of institutions, which, in turn, are sustainable enough to be assumed constant in relation to the  
aforementioned behaviour. In the same time those institutions can change under the influence of socially 
repetitive patterns of behaviour. Thirdly, referring to language as the most fundamental normative system 
allows to deduce the symptoms and patterns of an institutional change from the way that capital markets are 
described and discussed about.  
The new institutionalism uses to be traced back to R. Coase's paper „The Nature of The Firm” ( Coase 1937),  
although  earlier  references  may  be  provided,  especially  to  Knight  (1921),  Berle  &  Means  (1932),  
Chamberlin ( 1933 ), as well as Kaldor (1935). It has been developing, just as the old one, in a certain kind of 
opposition to classical  and neoclassical economics. Its focus, however, has been different: the “early new” 
institutionalists  seem to  have  had  been  inspired  by the  extraordinary development  of  modern  business  
corporation as socio – economic phenomenon. The central observation of the new institutionalism was that 
both individual and organizational behaviour, in the case of corporations, actually happen in quite different  
ways than those proposed by the Marshall's rules of optimal economic decisions ( Marshall 1890, 1920). All 
the authors referenced above noticed that business firms organized as corporations can both emerge very  
quickly and grow just as quickly, which results in big social structures based on private contracts competing  
for markets and resources, those social structures displaying a noticeable sustainability even in presence of  
adverse economic environment.  This milestone of new institutionalism, as well  as some of its  founders  
belonging to the so – called “Chicago school” - notably F. Knight and R. Coase - with its pronounced interest 
for the issue of free competition and regulation of markets, results in a strongly marked focus on “how do the 
firms grow” as the big question of the whole school.
On the grounds of this central scientific interest at least three distinct sub – streams seem to have appeared.  
The first one, called today “the theory of transaction costs”, draws upon the works of A.Alchian and H. 
Demsetz ( Alchian 1950; Demsetz 1968; Alchian, Demsetz 1972 ),  A.D.Chandler ( 1962, 1977) and O. 
Williamson ( 1975, 1985, 1991 ).  The main focus of this strand of research is the process of growth of 
business organizations, as well as the limits to this process. The most fundamental thesis of this school is that  
firms grow because it is more profitable for them, up to a certain point, to internalize portions of markets  
with their specific contracts. Another stream of research, which seems to originate from the seminal work of 
A. Berle and G. Means ( Berle, Means 1932),  focuses on the way that  contracts between management,  
shareholders and debt-holders of a company shape its structure, and, most of all, its performance. This path 
of research, going through successive developments in the writings of R.Wilson ( 1968), M. Berhold ( 1971 ) 
and S. Ross (1973) found, as it seems, its culmination in the “agency theory” formulated by M. Jensen and 
W. Meckling ( Jensen, Meckling 1976), with posterior developments, among others, by Fama and Jensen 
(1983). . The agency theory assumes that every business organization is a bundle of contracts between the 
“principals”, on one hand, who supply capital, and, on the other hand, the “agents”, who use this capital.  
Both parties aim at obtaining a satisfactory profit from agency. The concept of “satisfactory” profit, which is  
something different from the maximum profit, seems to be the cornerstone of the whole theory. It allows to  
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assume  that  both  the  suppliers  of  capital  and  its  users  can  find  satisfactory,  and  thus,  sustainable 
arrangements in contracts which are not  the best  of  all  possible but  which offer  just  what  one expects. 
Finally, starting from the works of Edith Penrose ( 1959), inspired by earlier works of P. Selznik on the 
sociology of organizations ( 1957), a whole stream of research, called today the “Resource – Based - View” ( 
see for example an excellent  review of literature by Foss 1998),  focused on the dichotomy and mutual  
relations between the administrative structure of a firm and the resources that the firm actually uses.  
The  new  institutionalism  displays  two  methodological  characteristics,  which  make  a  difference  in 
comparison to the old institutional school. Firstly, the neoinstitutionals use freely both the analytical tools 
usually attributed to mainstream economics -  the indifference curve, the maximization diagram etc. - and the 
neoclassical  pattern  of  translating  analytical  models  into  normative  prescriptions.  Secondly,  this  school 
generated many practical applications in management science, like the Kaplan's and Norton's  “Balanced 
Scorecard” ( ex Kaplan, Norton 1992, 1996) or the research about corporate governance ( ex. Schmidt 2003;  
Lazonick, O’Sullivan 1998; Shleifer, Vishny 1997; Jensen 1989 – 1997, 1993 – 1999, 2001). 
At the difference of the old institutionalism, the new one does not develop a theory of institutional change as 
such. Constant changes of economic environment in which firms operate, institutions included, is built in the  
very core of the theory and the question is more about the ways that firms adapt to those changes and the  
possible  outcomes  of  adaptation.  Thus,  the  new  institutionalism  is  particularly  useful,  as  theoretical  
background, when it comes to studying comprehensively the emergence of new patterns of firms' behaviour, 
size or structure included.  
The model
The emergence of alternative capital markets, besides the pre-existing main ones,  may be viewed as an  
institutional  change  from the  point  of  view  of  both  the  old  and  the  new institutional  school.  The  old 
institutional school's view would focus on the emergence of new legal regulations along with new patterns of 
behaviour.  The legal  change is  not  enough,   investors  and issuers  must  be willing to  participate  in  the 
alternative market and must be ready to consume this willingness in actual action.   The new institutional  
school would take the regulatory change as granted and attempt to explain why the patterns of behaviour of  
both investors and issuers are what they are, and, possibly predict what are they likely to be in the future. 
The general frame of the model introduced below is grounded in the theory of games, especially in the three  
economic Nobel prized ( 1994) game theories – those of  John Nash ( Nash 1950a, 1950b, 1951, 1953), John 
Harsanyi ( Harsanyi 1953; 1966; 1967; 1968 ) and Reinhard Selten ( Selten 1975). The current state of any 
social system may be represented as the outcome of a finite set of games, with each game being played by as 
a Harsanyi's game with imperfect information, with a finite set of players plays. Each game is, in turn, a sub-
game of a Selten's extensive game with imperfect recall. Each player i at the given moment t uses a set of 
pure Nash's strategies, which together for a mixed Nash's strategy, associated with a pay – off function (  
Equation 1 ). 
Equation 1 – General formula of strategy in a game
S(i;t) = [MA(i;t); R(i;t)]
– where S(i;t) is the mixed strategy of the player i at the moment t, MA(i;t) is the set of modalities of 
action of the player  i at the moment  t, R(i;t) is the set of results achieved by the player  i at the 
moment t.
The efficiency of every player's strategy is expressed by a general ratio  R(i;t)/MA(i;t).  Any given set of 
strategies S ( for the same player at different moments or at the same moment for different players ) displays  
a  variance  V(S) of  R(i;t)/MA(i;t),  which,  in  turn,  is  the  inversely proportional  estimator  of  the  overall 
consistency of the given set  of  strategies.  At any given moment  t in the given set of players there is a 
reference value V*(S;t) of V(S;t), which is the critical level and beyond which strategies become inconsistent. 
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There is dynamic equilibrium in the given game when V(S;t) remains below V*(S;t) ( Equation 2).  
Equation 2 – Condition of dynamic equilibrium
 V(S;t) < V*(S;t) or V(S;t)/V*(S;t) < 1
In dynamic equilibrium every individual strategy S(i;t) is in interaction with the space of the game in the 
sense that individual strategies of different players mutually shape one another. Modalities of action MA(i;t) 
are  imperfectly  heterogeneous  among  players.  A common reference  level  R*(t) may be  defined  at  the 
moment t for the aggregate results R(i;t) of every given player i. All strategies S(i;t) that bear results R(i;t) 
lower than the reference level  R*(t) are unsatisfactory for players. On the other hand strategies  S(i;t) with 
results R(i;t) > R*(t) are satisfactory. The set of players is fundamentally divided into two subsets: 
a)      subset {R(i;t) > R*(t)} of those players, whose strategies bring satisfactory results;
b)      subset {R(i;t) < R*(t)} of players with unsatisfactory results;
Players that belong to {R(i;t) > R*(t)} are motivated to carry on the current game in the sense of Harsanyi’s 
theory and they do so, tending to keep their modalities of actions unchanged. Those belonging to {R(i;t) < 
R*(t)}  have interest to change the rules of the game and to pass to another game, and they correspondingly  
modify their modalities of action. In the absence of dynamic equilibrium no typical modalities of action  
M*(x;t) as well as no common reference level R*(t) for results can arise as uncertainty is too high. Players 
define their relative satisfaction on the grounds of risk moderation, not results  R(i;t) as such. They seek to 
reduce uncertainty first and only then to optimize their results. As for modalities of action, high uncertainty 
makes  them change  so  quickly that  types  have  no  time  to  form.  Such  a  situation  is  self  –  propelling 
mechanism until some players reach the state described in Equation 2, which can become the core of new 
dynamic equilibrium.
The state of each game played in the given social system is described by four variables: V(S;t), V*(S;t),  
M*(x;t),  R*(t)  and by two ratios:  V(S;t)/V*(S;t) and  M*(x;t)/R*(t). The ratio  V(S;t)/V*(S;t) is the relative 
consistence of strategies played and  M*(x;t)/R*(t) is the relative efficiency of typical modalities of action. 
Dynamic equilibrium can emerge on the grounds of strategies of any level of efficiency. 
One of the games played in a social system is the capital market. The specificity of this game consists in its 
high degree of legal regulation and a correspondingly developed system of institutions, with a chief goal to  
manage  the  risk  resulting  from  uncertainty  V(S;t).  This  institutional  framework  generates  important 
transaction costs, and, in fact, the whole principle of risk management in capital markets consists in a trade –  
off:  less  risk at  the  price  of  more  transaction costs.  This  general  principle  is  put  into life  by the legal 
mechanism of certification: state authorities being in general charge of capital markets commission, through 
a system of certificates and licences, a certain number of private agents to guarantee for risk. Also, some of  
these agents can further commission other private agents to play the same role. As a result, transaction costs  
generated in capital markets are, in the same time, the revenues of those agents, which are such entities as: 
brokerage houses, banks, insurance firms, rating agencies, consulting firms etc.
As a result of uncertainty V(S) and proportionally to it every individual strategy S(i;t) in the capital market 
bears transaction costs  TC(i;t) which diminish the aggregate results  R(i;t) and alter the ratio of efficiency 
R(i;t)/MA(i;t).  The degree of this alteration is measured by the ratio  TC(i;t)/R(i;t). At any given moment 
there is a common reference value TC*(t) for individual transaction costs TC(i;t) and thus there is a common 
reference value for the ratio TC(i;t)/R(i;t), namely TC*(t)/R*(t).
Players willing to enter the game of capital market have to fulfil the conditions necessary for entry, and,  
among others, they have to incur transaction costs TC(i;t) > TC*(t), because they have to pay “the entrance 
ticket”, namely to pay banks for securing their IPO and consulting firms for preparing the proper disclosure  
of information. In this context a specific case in that of a firm too small or too young to enter the main capital 
market. Such a firm has two basic ways to reach the size and age sufficient for entry: a) to wait until its own  
organic growth leads to it or b) to merge with other, older firms. In the case (a) the firm incurs important  
opportunity costs due to the fact that the impossibility to go public makes it a weaker player in other markets,  
notably  the  product  markets.  Those  opportunity  costs  are  proportional  to  the  pace  of  growth  of  the  
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corresponding product markets. Faster these product markets grow, greater are the opportunity costs incurred 
by those who cannot fully use their potential fault of not being listed in public capital market. In the case (b)  
the owners of the firm have to do a trade – off: opportunities for control. If the inconveniences implied by 
both paths, (a) and (b), are perceived as too high, such a firm may look for possibilities to enter another  
capital markets, with lower barriers to entry. 
It is also possible that some players in the main capital market reach such a level of transaction costs TC(i;t) 
in their  individual  strategies  that  even in presence of  dynamic equilibrium,  with  V(S;t) < V*(S;t),  their 
strategies are inefficient, i.e.  TC(i;t)/R(i;t) > TC*(t)/R*(t).  These players look for ways of reducing their 
individual transaction costs. They can test two basic solutions. One is building market power within the 
existing institutions, to appropriate more economic rent from transactions and thus to provide for relatively 
high  transaction  costs.  Another  is  to  create  a  new  set  of  institutions  with  expected  transaction  costs 
TC(i;t)/R(i;t) < TC*(t)/R*(t) and a still acceptable level of uncertainty V'(S;t) < V*(S;t). The first solution is 
basically viable for all players, its actual application leading to the deepening of the problem TC(i;t)/R(i;t) > 
TC*(t)/R*(t)  and  V(S;t)  <  V*(S;t) for  those  who  do  not  succeed  in  this  path.  The  second  solution  is 
particularly good for the players with relatively big intangible assets, namely knowledge, experience and 
human resources allowing to reduce transaction costs. 
The factors named above can lead to the actual creation of alternative capital markets, besides the main ones,  
when the two conditions are fulfilled: a) there are quickly growing product markets is the given economy,  
with the efficiency of operational strategies composing a Nash's dynamic equilibrium b) there is a main 
capital market in the given economy, with the players' investment strategies not composing a Nash's dynamic  
equilibrium. Both conditions require a further development. 
As for the product markets, firms aim there at maximizing a complex set of results R(i;t;), composed of:  the 
scale of activity AS(i;t),  profitability PR(i;t), short – term accumulation of capital  SCA(i;t) and the long – 
term ability to accumulate capital LCA(i;t). In order to maximize these results firms use twofold modalities 
of action MA(i;t): a) projects related to investment in and exploitation specific technologies tech(i;t) and b) 
investments in non – specific financial assets fa(i;t), as a compensation of risks incurred in tech(i;t;) projects. 
Modalities  of  action  are  twofold  in  kind  but  multiple  in  practical  application:  a  firm  can  lead  many 
investment projects in the same time in each of the two categories. In presence of dynamic equilibrium the  
components of the set of results are causally linked: scale of activity AS(i;t) and profitability PR(i;t) generate 
short – term accumulation of capital  SCA(i;t),  which is the same as the long – term ability to accumulate 
capital LCA(i;t). The latter finds its outcome in the ability of the firm to bring to its shareholders the rate of 
return expected on the grounds of the risk observed, estimated in the same way that in the capital markets  
game, with Tobin's q. This causality assumed, the set of modalities of action is composed essentially of the 
tech(i;t) projects,  the  fa(i;t) investments playing a marginal  role,  as maximizing investment  in adequate 
tech(i;t) projects allows the maximization of results  R(i;t).   Without dynamic equilibrium in the product 
markets the risk related to tech(i;t) projects is so high that they remain under-invested, an over – important 
part of capital being placed in fa(i;t) investments, no obvious causality linking the components of the set of 
results R(i;t).
In the capital  market  each player  (i)  in the capital  market  game plays  a real  mixed strategy  S(i;t) with 
modalities of action MA(i;t) composed of a set of investments made  Iv(i;t) and liabilities contracted Lb(i;t), 
the set of results ( expected pay – offs ) consisting of a rate of return on capital invested in presence of the  
given level of risk. It is assumed, following the Tobin's q theory ( Tobin 1961, 1969; Tobin, Brainard 1968, 
1977) that there is a theoretical, empirically unobservable, though expected by market participants, free – of - 
risk rate of return on capital invested (  IR*). The real rate of return IR is compared with IR* by market  
participants and according to the current level of market volatility they expect a given real rate of return IR.  
In presence of dynamic equilibrium in the capital market game the ratio of IR/IR* is equal to the Tobin's q 
coefficient, computed with the formula:  q = [(n*p + a – eq)/a] ( Tobin, Brainard 1968, 1977) where n is the 
number of outstanding shares listed, p is the average price of shares, a is the book value of assets and eq is 
the value of equity. In other words, in presence of dynamic equilibrium in the capital market the overall  
market value of assets, in which the given investor had invested, including the debt possible to raise with the  
backing of these assets, all this measured with the Tobin's q coefficient is enough for investors to compensate 
their subjectively observable risk.  Without dynamic equilibrium the subjectively observable risk is so high  
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that the overall market value of assets possessed is not enough to compensate it. Therefore the expected rate  
of return IR, given the risk incurred, is so high that no realistically possible capital gains from investments in 
productive  assets  can  satisfy it.  Consequently,  players  focus  on  risk  management  through  hedging  and 
diversification of investments, instead of maximizing the overall rate of return IR. The ratio of efficiency 
M*(x;t)/R*(t) is impossible to compute then. Players divide into two groups: those minimizing volatility and 
those trying to maximize it. 
Conclusions and final remarks
There are two crucial factors of emergence of alternative capital markets: the behaviour of the main capital  
market's participants and the pace of growth of some particular product markets as well as the opportunities 
for firms to implement rational, even if suboptimal strategies in the same product markets. 
The institutions of the main capital markets, notably the system of commissioned private agents in charge of 
risk management and state authorities being the ultimate guarantor of safe trade, remain the cornerstone of  
the alternative capital markets. It is to stress very strongly that only in presence of well – developed main 
capital markets with their institutional framework, the assessment of uncertainty and transaction costs, by the 
market players, can be precise enough to push some of those players to search new institutional solutions. 
What's more, the players' essential rationale remains the same, they look for the possibility to implement 
rational, reasonably predictable investment and borrowing strategies. Thus, from the point of view of the old  
institutionalism,  even if  alternative capital  markets  are  run on a  different  normative basis,  the  essential  
downwards reconstitutive causation remains the same. Consequently, the institutional change is but partial. 
The most realistic way to achieve a reduction of transaction costs is to reduce the number of commissioned 
agents responsible for risk management in the capital market, or, to create such a set of institutions in which  
the  player(s)  that  had  migrated  from the  main  capital  market  is  (are)  the  most  powerful  and  thus  can  
appropriate the lion's part of economic rent from transactions. Thus, the part that changes in the institutional 
framework is essentially the scope and scale of contracts allowed in the capital market, not their essence.  
From the point of view of the new institutional school the change is more technical than fundamental.
The  overall  institutional  change  underpinning  the  emergence  of  alternative  capital  markets  is  not  of  a 
breakthrough nature. It is more of an incremental adaptation to exogenous technological changes. What's 
theoretically interesting in the process is the way that both public regulators and private agents actually  
cooperate to find the best ways do adapt. Learning within the current institutional framework seems to be 
very important for proper cooperation in this field. 
Technological progress and the related growth of product markets seem to be, therefore, the trigger of the  
change. Firms tend to innovate when they earn some kind of innovation premium due to market novelty or to 
the increase of productivity ( Arrow 1962; Barzel 1968; Kamien and Schwartz 1982; Scherer 1967; Loury 
1979). This premium tends to diminish as more and more firms innovate in the same markets. Innovation 
brings, among others, a greater diversity of goods offered to consumers. There might exist a contradiction,  
however, between the optimal diversity of products from the point of view of the consumer, on one hand and 
the same kind of diversity considered from the producer’s point of view ( Spence 1976; Dixit – Stiglitz 
1977). Some economist point out, right in the lines of the Schumpeterian tradition, that innovative activity is 
essentially a reaction to external pressures and an act of absorption of some exogenous scientific input rather 
than autonomous creation. Both reaction and absorption are greatly influenced by the imperative to imitate  
other market players (Katz, Shapiro 1985; Farrel, Saloner 1985; Abrahamson, Rosenkopf 1990, 1993). From 
this point of view strategies of firms vis a vis innovation may be rational though suboptimal, as imitation 
plays a more and more important role.  Besides, it is possible that once set on its tracks with an initial input 
of capital, the R&D function plays its own games and although internal to business organizations becomes  
autonomous in terms of goals and development paths (Phelps 1964; Barzel  1968). Besides,  any kind of 
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outlays of factors of production have to be considered in the context of alternative cost, should the latter be 
the simplest benchmark in the form of purely financial investment ( Jensen 1993). The financial peer is even  
more justified as firms can enter into possession of results of research or even of ongoing research projects  
through mergers and acquisitions (Sudarsanam 2003). All this taken into consideration, most of innovative 
activity seems to take place in markets apparently hostile to innovation, i.e. giving back negative marginal  
value added on innovation. Firms frequently innovate because they have to, under the pressure of product 
markets as well as their broad social environment, as well as they innovate simply because they can, because  
the R&D sector, that have been developing for decades, is now quite autonomous and generates a constant 
input  of  scientific  discoveries,  impossible to ignore.  Nevertheless,  this  pattern of technological  progress  
seems to be pretty durable. The main condition to its stability seems to be the development of financial  
markets,  as well  as their  stability to recover after  crises.  As long as financial  placements assure decent  
payoffs, accumulation of capital is likely to keep on going, particularly in firms with highly efficient R&D 
activity even if at the aggregate level marginal value added on innovation is negative (Waśniewski 2010).
Alternative  capital  markets  are  a  viable  solution  for  speeding  up  the  economic  growth  of  developing 
countries when at least one of the two following conditions is fulfilled. Firstly, there should be the proper  
product  markets  in  the  given  economy,  'proper'  meaning innovation,  quick  growth and Nash's  dynamic 
equilibrium. Secondly, there must exist sufficiently developed main capital markets, providing the necessary 
institutional foundation along with  the flow of market players migrating from them. Those two conditions  
can operate  jointly or  separately,  and,  for  the  developing countries  the  first  one seems to be crucial  in 
practice. If they already have or can create strong technological hubs in their territories, alternative capital  
markets can spur technological progress and economic growth, even if the main capital markets, being the  
benchmark for those, are in other countries.  
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